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Abstract: Cyber-Physical Systems are the result of integrating information and communication 
technologies into physical systems. One particular case are Cyber-Physical Power Systems (CPPS), which 
use communication technologies to perform real-time monitoring and operation. These kinds of systems 
have become more complex, impacting on the systems’ characteristics, such as their reliability. In addition, 
it is already known that in terms of the reliability of Cyber-Physical Power Distribution Systems (CPPDS), 
the failures of the communication network are just as relevant as the electrical network failures. However, 
some of the operators’ performances, such as response time and decision quality, during CPPDS 
contingencies have not been investigated yet. In this paper, we introduce a model to the operator response 
time, present a Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation methodology that incorporates the response time in 
CPPDS reliability indices estimation, and evaluate the impact of the operator response time in reliability 
indices. Our method is tested on a CPPDS using different values for the average response time of operators. 
The results show that the response time of the operators affects the reliability indices that are related to the 
durations of the failure, indicating that a fast decision directly contributes to the system performance. We 
conclude that the improvement of CPPDS reliability is not only dependent on the electric and 
communication components, but also dependent on operators’ performance. 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays, the majority of engineered systems have been integrated with Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) [1, 2], e.g., Marine Ships [3]. Additionally, modern society is 
increasingly reliant on engineered systems that are critical infrastructures, these include Water Distribution 
Systems [4] and Energy Systems [5], which should provide products and services in a reliable way [6]. 
The integration of ICTs into physical and engineered systems defines Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) 
[2]. CPSs are networked systems with actuators, sensors, and processors designed to interact with physical 
components, including the system user or operator [4]. These components are used to perform system 
operation using real-time information and control [7]. Despite these benefits, such systems are becoming 
even more complex and consequently, present new challenges concerning representation, modelling and 
quantification [1, 8]. 
Systems reliability is one of the CPSs challenges, as the number of components and connections in 
the system increases they also become more interdependent [1, 9]. This dependence between components 
makes the CPS more susceptible to cascading failures [10], i.e., a failure of one or more elements of the 
cyber system can cause a failure in others components of the physical system. Reliability of power systems 
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becomes an area of major focus [11] once the Smart Grid (SG) philosophy [12, 13] is leading to even more 
complex Cyber-Physical Power Systems (CPPSs). 
CPPSs raises the need for estimating the reliability of the two parts of the system operating 
simultaneously. A failure of the cyber network can cause erroneous measures of physical parameters and 
unrealized operator commands due to communication failure. Kirschen and Bouffard’s paper [14] 
summarizes several blackouts that started with information and communication network failures. In 
particular, the Italian blackout of 2003 and the Western and Central Europe incident of 2006 did not involve 
electrical components failures. 
During Power Distribution Systems contingencies, the system topology is dynamically changed to 
either solve or minimize contingency impacts, i.e., isolate the faulted parts and restore as many out-of-
service healthy areas as possible [14]. Such service restoration is performed in distribution operation centers, 
and the decision-making process is based on the expertise and knowledge of each human operator [15]. 
Consequently, the human operators performance directly affects the network operation [16]. 
Decision-Support Systems (DSSs) [17] have been proposed to improve operators performance during 
contingencies [14, 18]. The CPPS real-time monitoring and physical measures allow the development of 
Intelligent Systems that can infer during a contingency situation and help the distribution operator decision-
making process. Current reliability analysis of CPPS contemplates the integration of ICT in the Power 
System [19–24]. It is already known that Cyber network failures directly reduces the reliability of the CPPS, 
e.g., increases the loss of load probability [19]. 
However, the impact of operator performance during service restoration has not yet been investigated 
from a reliability viewpoint. During contingencies, the decision on service restoration is left to the operators, 
who already have other obligations [16]. Such decision making varies in quality and in time to be taken, and 
need to be embedded in modelling and simulation of CPS [25]. 
In this paper, we present a Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation methodology to estimate Cyber-
Physical Power Distribution Systems (CPPDS) reliability indices incorporating the operators’ response time 
and considering real-time network monitoring and operation. The operator response time is embedded in 
CPPDS failures simulation. The main contributions of this paper are:   
 Propose a stochastic model that reflects the human operators response time; 
 Introduce a simulation framework for reliability analysis of CPPDS that incorporates the 
operator’s response time during service restoration;  
 Evaluate the impact of such operator response time on the CPPDS reliability. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents information about CPPS and 
CPPDS service restoration, Section 3 shows the fundamentals of reliability analysis for CPPS and defines 
the human operator model, in Section 4 we introduce the proposed methodology, in Section 5 we perform a 
case study of our methodology, and Section 6 concludes this paper. 
2. Cyber-Physical Power Systems  
The Power Grid (Generation, Transmission and Distribution) are probably one of the most complex 
systems ever made [26]. In the USA [27], the electricity system has hundreds of generating units, hundreds 
of transmission lines, millions of transformers and hundreds of millions of protection and control elements. 
The transmission system energizes distribution feeders which delivers energy to the customers at buses 
through transformers [28].  
Some characteristics of the conventional power grid are one-way communication, few sensors, manual 
monitoring and restoration [29]. In contrast, the Smart Grid [13] is a power grid with an ICT network, 
allowing two-way communications, many sensors, self-monitoring, adaptive and islanding topologies. Such 
differences between the conventional and the SG aim to implement some properties into the power system 
[30], e.g., self-healing, high reliability and power quality, resistance to cyber-attacks and optimized 
monitoring and operation. 
ICT can be divided into some main categories [22]:  
 Data Acquisition: real-time data acquisition from important parts of the power grid, such as 
voltage at the buses. 
 Communication: responsible for delivering the acquired data to the information processing and 
for transmitting control signals to the actuators on the power grid.  
 Information Processing: processes the data to provide system information to the operator, it 
consists of monitoring tools and analysis software that provide reliable information about the 
power grid. 
 Graphical User Interface: displays all the power grid information collected and processed by the 
operator.  
Any failure of these parts is crucial for the operator decision-making during system contingency. It 
can cause incorrect system operation, e.g., a control signal can be not performed by and actuator. The ICT 
can provide erroneous measures or information about the current system state, or the ICT network may 
suffer a cyber-attack. Any of the mentioned situations can lead to a system failure, or a blackout, as 
exemplified in [31]. 
4 
 
 
 
2.1. CPPDS service restoration 
 
During CPPDSs contingencies [14] the faulted components are identified by the system operators 
through sensors between the system branches, the faulted branch are isolated by opening sectionalizing 
switches (normally-closed), and then, the operator reenergizes the healthy out-of-service branches after the 
disconnected one by closing tie switches (normally-open). The performance of isolation and restoration 
during contingencies is dependent of the switches that divide the feeders into branches, and the electrical 
capability of the system to restore the healthy branches after the faulted one [32]. 
The service restoration at distribution grid can be treated as a network reconfiguration [15], where the 
determination of a solution is a combinatorial problem [33]. Furthermore, the service restoration can be 
focused on different objectives [14, 15, 33], e.g., minimize the number of switching operations and out-of-
service customers. Additionally, changes in the system topology need to respect the system radiality and 
electrical constraints [14]. In summary, the service restoration is a multi-objective and multi-constrained 
problem that is solved by human operators at the distribution operation centers. 
The importance of human operators performance in power system have already been highlighted [16, 
25, 34]. Any human has limited cognitive functions, e.g., reasoning and memory capacities [16, 35], such 
limitations can affect the time to define the solutions as well as the solutions quality. 
3. Reliability Analysis of Cyber-Physical Power Systems 
Reliability Analysis aims to investigate systems operations and failures [36]; it is performed 
considering system configuration, redundancies, and the reliability data of system components. The 
reliability analysis is becoming more important since the electrical market is becoming even more 
competitive, and customers are more demanding with the quality of energy delivered.  
For evaluation of power system reliability, two main groups of techniques are used [20]: analytical 
methods, and Monte Carlo Simulation. The first one uses mathematical models and numerical algorithms to 
evaluate the system reliability and obtain the reliability indices, e.g.,  Falahati and Fu paper [19]. On the 
other hand, Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) is a virtual experiment that uses the stochastic aspect of system 
components to run a simulation of system behavior over a given time. 
MCS can be divided into two approaches: Pseudo-Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation [37] and 
Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation (SMCS) [36]. Pseudo-Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation [37] samples 
some states of the system using non-sequential simulation and simulate some neighboring states, these 
samples are used to obtain the reliability indices estimation. The SMCS generates a synthetic history of 
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system failures and repairs respecting the failure rates and repair times of each system’s component. The 
advantage of SMCS over Pseudo-SMCS is that we can repeat the simulation to obtain the estimation and 
the probability distribution of the reliability indices [38]. 
 
3.1. Sampling Failure and Repair Times 
 
We can consider that CPPDS branches and communication network components are a two-state 
system (working and failure) in which transition probabilities from one state to the other depend only on the 
present state, also known as a system with “lack-of-memory” [36].  Assuming that the failure rate (1) of a 
CPPDS branch is constant, i.e., after a failure, it can be considered new due to maintenance or replacement 
of the failed component, it can be modeled using an Exponential Reliability function (2) as follows: 
 𝜆 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
, (1) 
 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝜖−𝜆𝑡, (2) 
where 𝜆 is the failure rate, and 𝑅(𝑡) is the Reliability function. The Reliability function can be defined 
as [39] the probability of a system functioning properly during a specified time interval with the start from 
time zero (3). 
 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡) (3) 
We can obtain the cumulative distribution function (4), and the probability distribution function (5) 
using (2) and (3) as shown below: 
 𝑃(𝑡) =  𝑃(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡) = 1 − 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡) =   1 − 𝑅(𝑡), (4) 
 
𝑓(𝑡) =  
𝜕𝑃(𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
= 𝜆𝑒−𝜆𝑡. 
(5) 
Knowing that the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f) assumes values between 0 and 1 for different 
𝑡 values, we use the Inverse Transform Method [28, 36]: 
 𝑈 = 𝑃(𝑡) = 1 − 𝜖−𝜆𝑡, (6) 
where 𝑈 is the uniform distribution on the interval [0,1]. We can rewrite (6) as (7): 
 𝑡 = −
1
𝜆
ln(1 − 𝑈), (7) 
where (1 − 𝑈) also is the uniform distribution on the interval [0,1], and 𝑡 follows the exponential 
distribution (2). Finally, (7) can be rewritten as (8): 
 𝑡 = −
1
𝜆
ln(𝑈) (8) 
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Using (8) we can perform random sampling to simulate the system branches’ times to fail. Considering 
that the repair time (𝑡𝑟) follows a Normal distribution, 𝑡𝑟~𝑁(𝜇𝑟 , 𝜎𝑟
2), we use the Box-Muller method [40] 
to sample 𝑡𝑟 values for each branch failure, as follows: 
 𝑋 =  √−2 ln 𝑈1 cos (2𝜋𝑈2), (9) 
where 𝑈1 and 𝑈2 are uniform distributions in the interval [0,1] and 𝑋~𝑁(0,1), to obtain 𝑡𝑟~𝑁(𝜇𝑟 , 𝜎𝑟
2) 
we perform as (10): 
 𝑡𝑟 =  𝑋𝜎𝑟 + 𝜇𝑟, (10) 
 
3.2. Human Operator model 
 
Traditionally, SMCS consider the failures of electrical and communication components [19–24]. In 
order to simulate the human operator performance, we introduce a random variable to represent the time that 
takes an operator to define a solution during contingencies and we call it the Response Time of Operator 
(RTO). The random variable was chosen to enable the sampling of RTO during the SMCS, similar to time 
to failure and time to repair. A Normal probability distribution was adopted to describe the RTO: 
 𝑡𝑅𝑇𝑂~𝑁(𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂, 𝜎𝑅𝑇𝑂
2 ) (11) 
The Normal distribution mean (𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂) represents the average RTO, and its deviance (𝜎𝑅𝑇𝑂
2 ) represents 
both the best and the worst response times. The Box-Muller method [40] were used to sample the RTO for 
each failure, similar to repair time: 
 𝑋 =  √−2 ln 𝑈1 cos (2𝜋𝑈2), (12) 
 𝑡𝑅𝑇𝑂 =  𝑋𝜎𝑅𝑇𝑂 + 𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂 (13) 
 
3.3. Obtaining a State Transition Vector 
 
A state transition vector [28] describes the transitions between the working and failure states. It is 
obtained by using the sampling methodologies presented in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2. It is a synthetic history 
of system failures and repairs respecting the failure rates and repair times of each system part, and is obtained 
using the following steps: 
1. Define a duration length of the state transition vector (𝑇) and start the transition vector at time 
0 with the part of interest functioning properly; 
2. Sample the time to failure using equation (8) and add it to the vector; 
3. Sample the repair time using equations (9) and (10) and add the repair duration to the vector; 
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until the time 𝑇 is reached. 
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4. Proposed Methodology 
Our methodology consists of an SMCS that simulates the stochastic behavior of the following CPPDS 
parts: electrical components failures, communication network components failures and the system 
operation’s response time during contingencies. We consider as system failure the states that have customers 
without energy. 
Figure 1 illustrates our SMCS. The blue blocks represent the simulation of the cyber network failures. 
A state transition vector is computed for each communication component. If a communication switch fails, 
we will try to perform an optical switches path reconfiguration applying the Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol 
(RSTP) [41], which takes thirty seconds to reconfigure the communication paths, this time is incorporated 
in the state transition vector. When a controller fails the SMCS will sample a repair time.  
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Figure 1 – Proposed Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation methodology to incorporate electrical and communication 
components failures and the response time of operator in reliability indices of Cyber-Physical Power Distribution 
Systems. The yellow symbols represent the changes in the system topology for power restoration in healthy branches 
during contingencies. The blue symbols represent the impact of communication networks failures. The green symbols 
compute the operation response time impacts. 
The yellow blocks represent the process of isolate faulted branches and reenergized the healthy out-
of-service branches by opening sectionalizing switches and closing tie switches, this is performed 
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considering the electrical connectivity computed using a graph representation [33]. The green blocks 
compute the impact of the operator performance (RTO), if 𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂 > 0 we sample 𝑡𝑅𝑇𝑂 and consider that all 
the customers at the branches affected during contingency stay without energy during 𝑡𝑅𝑇𝑂. 
We obtain samples of the reliability indices using the duration and quantity of customers affected by 
each failure during one simulation. Repeating the simulation 𝑁 times, we obtain a set of samples that provide 
an estimation of the real value of the CPPS reliability indices. The SMCS calculates the following reliability 
indices [42]: Failure Rate, Availability, SAIDI, and SAIFI, defined in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Reliability indices calculated by SMCS [42]. Failure Rate and SAIFI are related to the failures occurrences, 
and Availability and SAIDI are related to the duration of the failures.  
 
Reliability indices Equation Description 
Failure Rate 𝜆 =  
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)
 
Average probability of system failure per year 
(failures/year) 
Availability 𝐴 =  
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)
 
Average percentage of time  the system is 
functioning per year 
SAIDI 𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼 =  
∑ 𝑈𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑖
 
System Average Interruption Duration Index 
(hours/system customer/year) 
SAIFI 𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼 =  
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑖
 
System Average Interruption Frequency Index 
(interruption/system customer/year) 
 
The Failure Rate represents the probability of failure for a system during a year, and it is only related 
to the occurrence of failure states. Whereas SAIDI and SAIFI are related to the impact of faults on system 
customers and indicate respectively, average duration and average frequency of failures weighted by the 
number of clients affected. Availability represents the percentage of time that the system works correctly 
during a year, and in a system with a high reliability [12], it can be measured by the “number of nines” (14). 
 𝑁9 = − log10(1 − 𝐴) (14) 
5. Methodology Verification - Case Study 
We applied our SMCS to the Civanlar’s distribution network [43], a monophasic three-feeder example 
distribution system obtained in the Repository of Distribution Systems (REDS) [44]. It consists of 13 
branches, 3 feeders, 13 sectionalizing switches and 3 tie-switches, as shown in Figure 2. It also presents 
fifteen feasible possibilities of topological reconfiguration (open a sectionalizing switch and closing a tie 
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switch) respecting the radiality and without isolating any branch, the total number of possibilities of 
switching options is much larger than fifteen. 
 
Figure 2 – Electrical topology of the Civanlar’s distribution network [43], which are a monophasic three-feeder example 
system. Its data is available in the Repository of Distribution Systems (REDS) [44]. It consists of 13 branches, 3 feeders, 
13 sectionalizing switches and 3 tie-switches. 
An ICT network was added to the system respecting the Falahati [24] conclusions about fiber-optic 
communication network topology impacts into CPPS reliability. The ICT system is connected in a 1-ring 
topology and consists of 13 communication switches, 13 controllers, and two servers. We assumed that all 
the sectionalizing and tie switches are automated (time to reconfiguration equals to zero), and the controllers 
are responsible for monitoring branches and changing the states of the electrical switches. The system 
topology is presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 – Representation of the Cyber-Physical Power System used in this paper. The Communication network has a 1-
ring topology, each communication switch is connected to two others, allowing network reconfiguration in case of 
failures using the RSTP protocol [41]. 
The assumed quantities of customers at each network branch are shown in Table 2. The failure rates 
used for the CPPDS components are given in Table 3, and they were chosen considering the typical 
distribution equipment outage statistics presented by Chowdhury and Koval [39]. The distribution feeders, 
fiber-optic cables, servers, and switches are assumed to be fully reliable.  
Our methodology presupposes that the distribution feeders are robust enough to handle the load 
transfer between each other during contingencies. All the cases were simulated using 𝑇 = 1000 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 
and 𝑁 = 1000. We used the "number of nines" presented in the Equation (14), Section 4 to describe the 
results of Availability. 
Table 2 – Quantity of customers energized by each Cyber-Physical Power System branch. 
 
Branch id Customers 
3 3 
4 5 
5 3 
6 2 
7 6 
8 8 
9 1 
12 
 
 
10 1 
11 7 
12 1 
13 1 
14 1 
15 3 
 
Table 3 – Failure Rates (𝝀) and repair time parameters in hours (𝝁𝒓 and 𝝈𝒓) adopted to perform this study. 
 
Component 
𝜆  
(failures/year) 
𝜇𝑟  
(repair time - hours) 
𝜎𝑟  
(repair time - hours) 
Branch 0,100 3 0,6 
Communication Switch 0,005 3 0,6 
Controller 0,010 3 0,6 
 
First we simulated two different cases to evaluate communication and electrical components failures 
impact in the reliability of CPPDS:  
I. Power Grid with a fully reliable Cyber network and 𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂 = 0: The system has a fully reliable 
automated electrical switches and real-time monitoring, and the operator decision is 
instantaneous. 
II. Power Grid with failures into Cyber network and 𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂 = 0: The same as the case above, but 
communication network can fail, resulting in a delay effect in system operation. 
This first test of our SMCS methodology is to validate the capability of measuring the impact of Cyber 
network failures in the reliability indices. The results estimated are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Reliability index using two different cases to evaluate the impact of communication and electrical components 
failures into the reliability of the studied Cyber-Physical Power System. 
 
 Reliability Index 
Case 
Availability 
(number of 
nines) 
SAIDI 
(hours/system 
customer/year) 
SAIFI 
(interruption/syste
m customer/year) 
Failure Rate 
(failure/year) 
Power Grid with a fully 
reliable Communication 
network 
3,386 0,457 0,152 1,200 
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Power Grid with failures into 
Communication network 
3,203 0,953 0,318 1,831 
 
Table 4 shows that our methodology correctly incorporates the communications failures impacts to 
the CPPS reliability indices. The network reliability parameters are better in cases I than II due to the 
assumption of a communication network fully reliable. The observed decline in reliability reflects the 
importance of integrating a reliable communication network into the Power System.  
A Cyber network failure can insert a delay during contingency situations, seeing that the distribution 
operation center will receive the information about contingency only if the communication network is 
functioning properly. Consequently, the duration of the average length of customers’ power interruptions 
increases.  
To analyze the impact of operation performance on the reliability of the CPPDS, we created different 
scenarios for the RTO and simulated them using the Power Grid with failures in the Communication network 
case. The RTO parameters used are presented in Table 5, each one represents different performances of a 
human operator making a decision during a system contingency. 
 
Table 5 – Values of 𝝁𝑹𝑻𝑶 and 𝝈𝑹𝑻𝑶 used to simulate the response time of operator. 
 
Response Time of Operator 
𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂 (minutes) 𝜎𝑅𝑇𝑂 
0 0 
1 0.2 
5 1 
10 2 
20 4 
40 8 
60 12 
The reliability indices estimated using our SMCS considering the parameters in Table 5 for RTO are 
presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 - Reliability indices obtained for the CPPS with failures into Communication and Electrical components using 
the different average RTO values described in Table 5. 
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 Reliability Index 
μRTO 
Availability 
(number of 
nines) 
SAIDI 
(hours/system 
customer/year) 
SAIFI 
(interruption/system 
customer/year) 
Failure Rate 
(failure/year) 
0 3,202699 0,953233 0,317813 1,831448 
1 3,201778 0,956284 0,335595 1,899846 
5 3,198109 0,968502 0,335595 1,899846 
10 3,193573 0,983746 0,335595 1,899846 
20 3,184608 1,014060 0,335595 1,899846 
40 3,167266 1,075147 0,335595 1,899846 
60 3,150581 1,136235 0,335595 1,899846 
  
The increase of the response time directly affects the reliability indices that accounts failures durations 
– Availability and SAIDI, as the impact of a fast operation is related to the length of customers’ power 
interruptions. When the 𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂 > 0, SAIFI and Failure Rate are affected because customers in the healthy 
out-of-service branches enter in failure state during the human operator’s decision making. However, the 
impact is the same for any 𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂 > 0, since Failure Rate and SAIFI indices are related only to outages 
occurrence and are not influenced by the outages duration. 
Table 7 presents the percentage of these impacts. The indices that consider only failure occurrence are 
not affected by the response time since the number of failures is not either. It is important to highlight that 
this study investigates the response time of the operator’s impact on CPPS reliability; we do not analyze the 
effects of the operator’s decision quality. 
 
Table 7 – Percentage difference in Availability and SAIDI indices when increasing the average RTO parameter on our 
methodology. 
 
 Reliability Index 
𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂 
(minutes) 
Availability 
(number of nines) 
%Availability 
SAIDI 
(hours/system 
customer/year) 
%SAIDI 
0 3,202699 - 0,953233 - 
1 3,201778 0,028761 0,956284 0,320065 
5 3,198109 0,114583 0,968502 1,277722 
10 3,193573 0,141847 0,983746 1,573916 
20 3,184608 0,564858 1,014060 6,381158 
40 3,167266 1,106352 1,075147 12,789561 
60 3,150581 1,627311 1,136235 19,198040 
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The impact of considering 𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂 = 1 is less than 1% for both SAIDI and Availability. On the other 
hand, the effect of considering 𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂 > 40 in Availability is more than 1%. The impact in SAIDI is greater 
than 1% for 𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂 = 5 minutes, and for 𝜇𝑅𝑇𝑂 = 60, the impact is almost 20%. Such impacts are also shown 
in Figure 4. It indicates that a quick response time of operators is essential to the CPPDS reliability.   
 
Figure 4 – Percentage difference in CPPS Availability and SAIDI indices by the average RTO used in each scenario. The 
greater the average response time values, the larger the effect on reliability indices. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented a stochastic model to enable the incorporation of human operator’s 
performance in a Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation that integrates electrical and communication 
components failures, and the response time of human operators in the calculus of Cyber-Physical Power 
System reliability indices. Different average response time values were used for simulation and the 
reliability indices obtained were analyzed. 
Our results show the capability of our model to simulate the stochastic behavior of a Cyber-Physical 
Power System considering electrical and communication components failures, together with the response 
time of human operators. Moreover, the results indicate that the average response time of operator affects 
the reliability indices related to power interruptions durations. It also indicates that the average response 
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time directly affects the reliability indices, showing that not considering such variable results in a bias of the 
reliability estimators. 
In our case study, the RTO effect in Availability and SAIDI indices is linear, which is a consequence 
of the small size of our test system. The simulation generated failures with large time interval between them 
and without multiple failures. For a large-scale system, multiple failures will occur and the time interval 
between failures will be shorter, causing a chain effect for large response time, i.e., while the operators are 
making the decision for a failure another failure may happen. 
The main advantage of our methodology is the capability to incorporate the human operator’s 
performance considering the time necessary to make a decision. This time is present in every decision during 
contingencies since the human operator needs to consider many variables during their decision-making 
process. 
In systems that do not have automated switches, the impact of the operators' response time will be 
reduced in comparison to our case study because the time to operate the switches is greater (we considered 
all the switches automated and with quick operation after the operator decision). The switches’ operation 
time are affected by different factor, such as the number of crews to operate the manual switches and the 
area covered by the operation center. 
Such findings reinforce the importance of Decision Support Systems development to the operation of 
Cyber-Physical Power Systems. CPPS are becoming even more reliable by using Information and 
Communication Technologies. Once the response time of the system operators also needs to be improved 
by such integration, investments in operators training and knowledge are necessary to improve performance 
and allow the adoption of new Decision Support Systems technologies. 
It is important to mention that we only considered the time of decision-making. Our simulation 
assumes that the operation procedure always leads to the best configuration during contingencies. 
Incorporating the quality of the operator’s decision may lead to additional findings on the impact of human 
operator’s performance to Cyber-Physical Power Distribution Systems reliability. Application of the 
proposed methodology in real CPPDS can improve the capacity to estimate the reliability indices and help 
in directing investments to improve overall system reliability. 
7. Acknowledgments 
This paper is part of a project of Research and Development of Brazilian Electricity Regulatory 
Agency (PD 2866-0272/2012). The authors are also grateful to financial support from the National Council 
of Technological and Scientific Development (CNPq Brazil – Process Nº 475064/2013-5). 
17 
 
 
8. References 
1 Shin, D., He, S., Zhang, J.: ‘Robust, Secure, and Cost-Effective Design for Cyber-Physical Systems’IEEE 
Intell. Syst., 2014, 29, (1), pp. 66–69.  
2 Boyes, H.A.: ‘Trustworthy cyber-physical systems - a review’, in ‘8th IET International System Safety 
Conference incorporating the Cyber Security Conference 2013’ (Institution of Engineering and Technology, 
2013), pp. 3.1–3.1 
3 Xiaoping Wu, Liangli Ma, Zebo Feng, Wei Ren: ‘Toward cyber-physical networks and smartly active 
sensing IETM for equipment maintenance in marine ships’, in ‘IET International Conference on Information 
and Communications Technologies (IETICT 2013)’ (Institution of Engineering and Technology, 2013), pp. 
599–603 
4 Wang, Z., Song, H., Watkins, D.W., et al.: ‘Cyber-physical systems for water sustainability: challenges and 
opportunities’IEEE Commun. Mag., 2015, 53, (5), pp. 216–222.  
5 Shi, J., Wan, J., Yan, H., Suo, H.: ‘A survey of Cyber-Physical Systems’, in ‘2011 International Conference 
on Wireless Communications and Signal Processing (WCSP)’ (IEEE, 2011), pp. 1–6 
6 Zio, E.: ‘Reliability engineering: Old problems and new challenges’Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf., 2009, 94, (2), pp. 
125–141.  
7 Rajkumar, R. (Raj), Lee, I., Sha, L., Stankovic, J.: ‘Cyber-physical systems’, in ‘Proceedings of the 47th 
Design Automation Conference on - DAC ’10’ (ACM Press, 2010), p. 731 
8 Zio, E.: ‘Reliability Analysis of Complex Network Systems: Research and Practice in Need’IEEE Trans. 
Reliab., 2008, 57, (3), pp. 1–4.  
9 Chiuso, A., Fortuna, L., Frasca, M., Rizzo, A., Schenato, L., Zampieri, S.: ‘Understanding Complex 
Systems: Modelling, Estimation and Control of Networked Complex Systems’ (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 
2009) 
10 Buldyrev, S. V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E., Havlin, S.: ‘Catastrophic cascade of failures in 
interdependent networks’Nature, 2010, 464, (7291), pp. 1025–1028.  
11 Bhatt, J., Shah, V., Jani, O.: ‘An instrumentation engineer’s review on smart grid: Critical applications and 
parameters’Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev., 2014, 40, pp. 1217–1239.  
12 Heydt, G.T.: ‘The Next Generation of Power Distribution Systems’IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2010, 1, (3), pp. 
225–235.  
13 Fang, X., Misra, S., Xue, G., Yang, D.: ‘Smart Grid - The New and Improved Power Grid: A Survey’IEEE 
Commun. Surv. Tutorials, 2012, 14, (4), pp. 944–980.  
14 Camillo, M.H.M., Romero, M.E. V, Fanucchi, R.Z., et al.: ‘Validation of a methodology for service 
restoration on a real Brazilian distribution system’, in ‘2014 IEEE PES Transmission & Distribution 
Conference and Exposition - Latin America (PES T&D-LA)’ (IEEE, 2014), pp. 1–6 
15 Castillo, A.: ‘Risk analysis and management in power outage and restoration: A literature survey’Electr. 
Power Syst. Res., 2014, 107, pp. 9–15.  
16 Amin, M.: ‘Energy infrastructure defense systems’, in ‘Proceedings of the IEEE’ (2005), pp. 861–875 
17 Arnott, D., Pervan, G.: ‘Eight key issues for the decision support systems discipline’Decis. Support Syst., 
2008, 44, (3), pp. 657–672.  
18 Zonouz, S., Davis, C.M., Davis, K.R., Berthier, R., Bobba, R.B., Sanders, W.H.: ‘SOCCA: A Security-
Oriented Cyber-Physical Contingency Analysis in Power Infrastructures’IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2014, 5, 
(1), pp. 3–13.  
19 Falahati, B., Fu, Y.: ‘Reliability Assessment of Smart Grids Considering Indirect Cyber-Power 
Interdependencies’IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2014, 5, (4), pp. 1677–1685.  
18 
 
 
20 Celli, G., Ghiani, E., Pilo, F., Soma, G.G.: ‘Reliability assessment in smart distribution networks’Electr. 
Power Syst. Res., 2013, 104, pp. 164–175.  
21 Chaudonneret, T., Decroix, H., McDonald, J.D.F.: ‘Representation of the influence of telecommunications 
on electrical distribution network reliability’, in ‘2012 IEEE Third International Conference on Smart Grid 
Communications (SmartGridComm)’ (IEEE, 2012), pp. 258–263 
22 Panteli, M., Kirschen, D.S.: ‘Assessing the effect of failures in the information and communication 
infrastructure on power system reliability’, in ‘2011 IEEE/PES Power Systems Conference and Exposition’ 
(IEEE, 2011), pp. 1–7 
23 Pilo, F., Celli, G., Jupe, S., Taylor, J.: ‘Assessing the impact of ICT on the reliability of active distribution 
systems’, in ‘22nd International Conference and Exhibition on Electricity Distribution (CIRED 2013)’ 
(Institution of Engineering and Technology, 2013), pp. 1370–1370 
24 Falahati, B., Fu, Y., Wu, L.: ‘Reliability Assessment of Smart Grid Considering Direct Cyber-Power 
Interdependencies’IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2012, 3, (3), pp. 1515–1524.  
25 Amin, S.M.: ‘Securing the electricity grid’Bridg. Q. Publ. US Natl. Acad. Eng., 2010, 40, (1), pp. 13–20.  
26 Pagani, G.A., Aiello, M.: ‘Towards Decentralization: A Topological Investigation of the Medium and Low 
Voltage Grids’IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2011, 2, (3), pp. 538–547.  
27 El-Sharkawi, M.A.: ‘Electric Energy: An Introduction’ (CRC Press, 2012, Third Edit) 
28 Billinton, R., Li, W.: ‘Reliability assessment of electric power systems using Monte Carlo methods’ 
(Springer Science+Business Media, 1994) 
29 Farhangi, H.: ‘The path of the smart grid’IEEE Power Energy Mag., 2010, 8, (1), pp. 18–28.  
30 Kayastha, N., Niyato, D., Hossain, E., Han, Z.: ‘Smart grid sensor data collection, communication, and 
networking: a tutorial’Wirel. Commun. Mob. Comput., 2014, 14, (11), pp. 1055–1087.  
31 Kirschen, D., Bouffard, F.: ‘Keeping the lights on and the information flowing’IEEE Power Energy Mag., 
2009, 7, (1), pp. 50–60.  
32 Avritzer, A., Suresh, S., Menasché, D.S., et al.: ‘Survivability models for the assessment of smart grid 
distribution automation network designs’, in ‘Proceedings of the ACM/SPEC international conference on 
International conference on performance engineering - ICPE ’13’ (ACM Press, 2013), p. 241 
33 Delbem, A.C.B., de Carvalho, A.C.P. de L.F., Bretas, N.G.: ‘Main Chain Representation for Evolutionary 
Algorithms Applied to Distribution System Reconfiguration’IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 2005, 20, (1), pp. 
425–436.  
34 Andersson, G., Donalek, P., Farmer, R., et al.: ‘Causes of the 2003 Major Grid Blackouts in North America 
and Europe, and Recommended Means to Improve System Dynamic Performance’IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 
2005, 20, (4), pp. 1922–1928.  
35 Wagholikar, K.B., Sundararajan, V., Deshpande, A.W.: ‘Modeling paradigms for medical diagnostic 
decision support: a survey and future directions.’J. Med. Syst., 2012, 36, (5), pp. 3029–49.  
36 Zio, E.: ‘The Monte Carlo Simulation Method for System Reliability and Risk Analysis’ (Springer-Verlag, 
2013) 
37 Mello, J.C.O., Pereira, M.V.F., Leite da Silva, A.M.: ‘Evaluation of reliability worth in composite systems 
based on pseudo-sequential Monte Carlo simulation’IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 1994, 9, (3), pp. 1318–1326.  
38 Dzobo, O., Gaunt, C.T., Herman, R.: ‘Investigating the use of probability distribution functions in reliability-
worth analysis of electric power systems’Int. J. Electr. Power Energy Syst., 2012, 37, (1), pp. 110–116.  
39 Chowdhury, A., Koval, D.: ‘Power distribution system reliability: practical methods and applications’ (John 
Wiley & Sons Inc, 2011) 
40 Box, G.E.P., Muller, M.E.: ‘A Note on the Generation of Random Normal Deviates’Ann. Math. Stat., 1958, 
19 
 
 
29, (2), pp. 610–611.  
41 Galea, M., Pozzuoli, M.: ‘Redundancy in Substation LANs with the Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol ( IEEE 
802 . 1w )’Electr. Energy T&D Mag., 2003, pp. 66–68.  
42 Čepin, M.: ‘Assessment of Power System Reliability’ (Springer, 2011) 
43 Civanlar, S., Grainger, J.J., Yin, H., Lee, S.S.H.: ‘Distribution feeder reconfiguration for loss reduction’IEEE 
Trans. Power Deliv., 1988, 3, (3), pp. 1217–1223.  
44 Kavasseri, R., Ababei, C.: ‘REDS: REpository of Distribution Systems’, http://www.dejazzer.com/reds.html, 
accessed February 2015 
 
